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What explains the outcomes of chance processes? We
claim that their setups do. Chances, we think, mediate
these explanations of outcome by setup but do not fea-
ture in them. Facts about chances do feature in expla-
nations of a different kind: higher-order explanations,
which explain how and why setups explain their out-
comes. In this paper, we elucidate this ’mediator view’ of
chancy explanation and defend it from a series of objec-
tions. We then show how it changes the playing field
in four metaphysical disputes concerning chance. First,
it makes it more plausible that even low chances can
have explanatory power. Second, it undercuts a circu-
larity objection against reductionist theories of chance.
Third, it redirects the debate about a prominent argu-
ment against epistemic theories of chance. Finally, it
sheds light on potential chancy explanations of the Uni-
verse’s origin.
1 THEMEDIATOR VIEWOF CHANCY EXPLANATION
1.1 Introduction: Three views
There has been a lot of ambivalence in the philosophy of scientific explanation about how
explanation works in the case of objectively chancy events, of the sort that one might encounter
in fundamental physics, in genetics, or in meteorology. In this paper we aim to clarify the debate
about chance and explanation, to motivate and defend the view that chances mediate event
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F IGURE 1 Arrows represent explanatory
relationships between facts, with blue arrows
indicating causal explanation and red arrows
indicating non-causal explanation [Color figure
can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
F IGURE 2 Solid red lines indicate
grounding dependence, solid blue lines indicate
causal dependence, and dotted lines indicate
our disapproval [Color figure can be viewed at
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explanations without themselves explaining chancy events, and to explore the implications of
this view for some controversial topics in recent scientific metaphysics.
There are three core approaches to explaining the occurrence of objectively chancy events:
∙ No explanation: nothing explains chancy events.
∙ Chances explain: facts about chances explain chancy events.
∙ Setups explain: facts about chance setups explain chancy events.
The first approach ties scientific explanation to determinism. Where an event is undetermined
by the preceding states of the world, there is simply nothing true and informative to say about
why that event happened. At most we may be able to say why it was likely to happen.
The second approach comes in at least two versions: high-chance and any-chance. According to
the high-chance version, chances explain events only when the chance of the event is sufficiently
high; for views on which higher chances explain better, see Hempel (1965), Strevens (2006), and
Skow (2014).1 According to the any-chance version, an event’s chance explains it no matter how
high or low that chance may have been.2
The third approach is the one which we prefer. On this mediator view of chancy explanation,
chances don’t directly explain chancy events; instead, they mediate chancy explanations holding
between events. In such explanations, we will say that the setup explains the outcome. Chance
itself is not an explainer of events but a mediator of event explanations.
Themediator view does not have the implausible consequence that chances do not explain any-
thing at all. On the contrary, the role which chances play in mediating chancy explanations gives
them a central explanatory role, at a level once removed: chances directly explain why, and/or
how, and/or that, the setup explains the outcome. Precursors to this view include Scriven (1959),
Humphreys (1989) and Skow (2014, 2016).
1 Skow has a mixed view, according to which chances feature in “nearly necessary” explanations of events with very high
chances, but don’t feature at all in chancy causal explanations. As we see it, Skow’s view is a precursor to our view in
cases of chancy causal explanation, but we go further than Skow in arguing that chances mediate explanation even in the
“nearly necessary” case.
2 This view is defended by Elliott (forthcoming, MS).
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In the remainder of section 1, we set the scene for our discussion and present the mediator
view. We then defend the first component of the view, that chances don’t explain particular
events, in section 2. In section 3, we defend the second component of the view, that chances
explain these first-order explanatory facts. In section 4 we apply the view to cast potential light
on four controversies within scientific metaphysics: the explanation of unlikely events, the
circularity objection against Humeanism, the adequacy of epistemic accounts of chance, and the
explanation of why there is something rather than nothing. Section 5 is a conclusion.
1.2 Distinctions and background
We aim to remain neutral on some foundational questions about chance. In particular, themedia-
tor view does not commit us to any particular metaphysics of chance; it is instead a view about the
structure and explanatory target of chance-based explanations. Although we will discuss its bear-
ing on some metaphysical debates below (in section 4), we take the view to be compatible with
any account of chance which takes chance-based explanation seriously. In particular, we address
our arguments to anyone who acknowledges that there are true statements ascribing objective
probabilities to events.
A key distinction on which the mediator view of chance is based is the distinction between
first-order and higher-order explanations. At a first pass, in a first-order explanation, one thing
explains another thing, while in a higher-order explanation something explains why some first
order explanation obtains. This distinction has recently been developed in detail by Bradford Skow
in his book Reasons Why (2016), but the idea goes back at least to Scriven (1959). Hitherto the
distinction between orders of explanation hasmainly been applied in the context of laws of nature
(where, intuitively, it has been thought inappropriate that laws of nature should be first-order
explainers alongside other first-order explainers such as physical causes). The primary task of this
paper is to apply the distinction between orders of explanation to the case of chancy explanation;
we think the distinction helps make sense of chancy explanation just as well as it helps make
sense of non-chancy explanation.
We will take it that explanations hold in full generality between facts; that is, facts feature as
both the explanantia (the explainers) and the explananda (the explained) of explanations. This
fact-based approach allows us to offer a unified treatment of chancy event explanations and the
higher-level explanations which we think chances themselves provide. However, our primary
focus is on cases of chancy event explanation. In these cases, the relevant facts are what we call
occurrence facts: facts which specify that some particular event occurs. Where an event C causes
an event E, the occurrence fact FC explains the occurrence fact FE. Many of the first-order expla-
nations we discuss will be straightforward (albeit chancy) causal explanations, and causation (at
least in the most familiar sense) is a relation between events. Roughly speaking, we assume that
a relation of causal explanation holds between facts when those facts specify the occurrence of
events which themselves stand in a causal relation. However, we try not to presuppose any spe-
cific account of causation in what follows.
In our examples we will refer to (what we take to be) the explanans event(s) for a chancy event
explanation as the setup, and to the explanandum event as the outcome. The setup fact is then the
fact that the setup occurs, and the outcome fact is the fact that the outcome occurs. Finally, the
chance fact is the fact which specifies the chance of the outcome fact conditional on the setup
fact: ch(O|S) = x. Thus the setup might be the rolling of a fair die (or the activation of a suitably-
configured laboratory apparatus) and the outcome would be the die landing ’5 ’; the setup fact
4 HICKS and WILSON
would be the fact that the die is rolled and the outcome fact the fact that it lands ’5 ’; the chance fact
would be the fact that the chance of rolling a ’5 ’ is equal to ⅙.Where there is no risk of confusion,
and to streamline our discussion,we sometimes drop the ’fact’ and talk simply of setups explaining
outcomes, mediated by chances.
While in some cases it may be vague or context-dependent or simply unclear whether some
fact is part of the setup fact or instead part of the background conditions for the explanation, we
will not need to worry much about that distinction; our focus is on the explanatory role of the
chance facts, and all we need for our purposes is that these be kept distinct from the setup facts.
Chance facts say that the chance of a specific event occurring conditional on some other specific
event occurring takes some real value between 0 and 1. For the most part, we will be interested in
chance values that are not equal to 0 or 1; we set aside complications that arise from the possibility
of probability-zero events occurring.
Can we say anything positive and informative about the setup facts? Yes; but what we say will
depend on which theory of chance is in the background. For a theory according to which chances
are intrinsic (most realist theories of chance), one can identify the setup fact with the facts about
the physical system in question. On difference-making accounts of chancy causation, the setup
fact is whatever increases the chance of the outcome fact.
It’s worth noting that setups can be quite complex. For example, the setupswhich explain stable
frequencies are not one-off events, but instead uniform features of groups of events. The fact that
about half of the coins came up heads is explained by the fact that all of the coins were fairly
flipped; the fact that about half of our atoms decayed over a 20-minute interval is explained by
the fact that they were all carbon-11 atoms. This does not make the explanation any less chancy:
stable frequencies are not guaranteed to result from such setups. It’s possible for you to flip your
fair coin any number of times and get heads each time, as in Tom Stoppard’s play Rosencrantz
and Guildenstern are Dead. It’s simply that the chance of this long-term outcome is very, very low.
Just as one-off setups explain one-off outcomes by making them likely, or more likely than they
would otherwise be, complex temporally-extended setups explain long-term outcome frequencies
by making them likely, or more likely than they would otherwise be.
In addition to neutrality on the background theory of chance at work, we aim for neutrality
(insofar as is possible) on the background metaphysics of causal explanation in a world with gen-
uine chances. This also goes for the background metaphysics of fundamentality. We are aiming
to stay neutral on whether there is a fundamental level, and (if so) whether the chances at that
level have a special kind of metaphysical status. Everything we say is intended to apply both to
putative fundamental chances and to putative non-fundamental chances. For further discussion,
see Hoefer (2007, 2019), Glynn (2011), Handfield and Wilson (2014), Emery (2015, 2017).
With the preliminaries complete, it’s time to state the view which we aim to defend.
1.3 Statement of the mediator view
The mediator view of chancy explanation involves two principal claims:3
3We understand explanation to be contrastive in nature; but explicitly identifying the contrasts is often cumbersome, so
in our presentation of the view we suppress them. For avoidance of doubt, however, we expect there to sometimes be no
explanation at all of why one outcome of a chance process occurs rather than some other outcome, even though there will
be an explanation of the fact that it occurs rather than itself not occuring. For more detail on chancy contrasts, see section
3.4.
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Setups Explain Outcomes: Outcome facts are directly explained only by their setup facts:
chance facts do not explain outcome facts.
ChancesMediate Explanation: Chance facts are explanantia in higher-order explanations: a
particular chance fact explains why some particular setup fact explains some particular outcome
fact.4
Take Setups Explain Outcomes first. It is both a positive claim – explanations of outcomes of
chancy processes are explained by their setup facts – and a negative claim – nothing other than
the setup fact explains the outcome fact. In particular, the chance of the outcome does not explain
it. Although most extant views of chancy explanation accept the positive claim, most of them
would deny the negative claim and give chances a direct role in the explanation of outcomes. We
think that this is a mistake: chances play a different explanatory role, at one level removed, by
explaining the explanation of outcomes by their setups.
The indirect explanatory role of chances is captured on our view by Chances Mediate Expla-
nation. As described in the previous section, we distinguish between first-order explanations –
roughly, explanations of one event by another – and higher-order explanations of facts about first-
order explanations. To say that something mediates a first-order explanation is, in our terms, to
say that it is part of the higher-order explanation of why the first-order explanation holds. So to
say that chancesmediate chancy explanations is to say that chance facts higher-order-explainwhy
first-order chancy explanations of outcome facts by setup facts obtain.
Our aim is to stay as neutral as possible between different accounts of scientific explanation;
consequently we aim to stay as neutral as possible on the details of how higher-order explanations
involving chances work. But to give a taste: if probability-raising accounts of chancy explanation
are correct, then since the chances are what ground the fact that the setup raises the probability
of the outcome, the chances will also ground the fact that the setup explains the outcome.
It will help to see an example of the mediator view in action. Suppose we isolate
an unstable atom (say, bohrium, which has a half life of about a minute); call the pro-
cess of preparing an isolated bohrium atom P. Individual atoms prepared in way P each
have a chance 0.9999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999995 of
decaying within a few hours. Now suppose we prepare an atom in way P and it decays 30 seconds
later. According to the mediator view, it is not the fact that its chance of decaying within a few
hours was so high that explains its decay within a few hours; instead, it’s the fact that the atom
was prepared in way P that explains why it decayed within that time-frame. The chancy fact –
that atoms prepared in way P have a chance of decay within a few hours very near 1 – explains
the first-order explanatory fact, that the atom’s being prepared in way P explains its decay within
a few hours.
In most chancy cases, when a setup explains an outcome, it does not guarantee it. We hypothe-
size that this is one of the reasons that some philosophers reject Setups Explain Outcomes. On
one way of thinking about explanation, to show that something is explained is (at least) to show
that it should be expected. But if the setup doesn’t necessitate the outcome, as in chancy cases, we
can get into trouble if we predict the outcome with certainty.
We suggest that, in cases of full explanation, the setup does necessitate the outcome. Chancy
explanations, then, are mere partial explanations. What is interesting about irreducibly chancy
4 To accommodate the null-explanation suggestion floated in section 4.5, we might prefer a slight variant:ChancesMedi-
ate Explanation*: Chance facts are explanantia in higher-order explanations: a particular chance fact explains how some
particular outcome fact is explained.
5 Thanks to Sylvia Rose for selecting this value.
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events is that they can be partially but not fully explained by other events. Even though the setup
partially explains the outcome, no event is a full explanation of the outcome. The setup is then
an irreducibly partial explanation, which cannot be completed into a full explanation by citing
additional events. So, in the atomic decay case above, the event of the atom being prepared in way
P partially explains the atom’s decay within a few hours. But nothing fully explains that decay;
that is, nothing explains why the atom did not on this occasion flukily persist for days. It was just
a matter of chance.
The view of chance explanations as partial retains the connection between explanation and
expectation. A full explanation, on this view, posits reasons which would justify full confidence
in the outcome. A partial explanation justifies partial confidence. (We discuss the connection
between explanation and expectation in more detail in section 3.1.) In chancy explanation, where
the chance of the outcome is less than 1, the explanation is always partial. This is, in some ways,
a merely terminological choicepoint: one could instead choose to count the setup as a full expla-
nation, simply because there are no other facts that could be added to it. We think that, although
the setup is complete in this sense, it does not fully explain the outcome.6 In chancy cases, we can
keep the connection between full explanation and necessitation, or the connection between full
explanation and completeness, but not both. We choose the former.
To what degree does the setup explain the outcome in these partial cases? It’s tempting to iden-
tify the amount that the setup explains the outcome with the chance of the outcome conditional
on the setup. If that chance is 1, the outcome is guaranteed and so fully explained; if it is less than 1,
then the outcome is explained to the extent that the setupmakes it likely. While this identification
is tempting, we are not sure that it will work on all accounts of chancy explanation – for example,
on a chance-raising account, is the degree of explanation the difference between the actual chance
and what it would have been without the setup, or just the chance given the setup? So we will set
this aside.7
We have said that first-order explanations of chancy outcomes by their setups are irreducibly
partial: they cannot be filled out into a full explanation. Are the higher-order explanations sim-
ilarly partial? When I toss a fair coin and it lands heads, the 50% chance of heads higher-order-
explains why the tossing of the coin first-order-explains the coin’s landing heads. This higher-
order explanation does not necessitate the landing heads – after all, the value of the chance is
equally compatible with the incompatible scenario in which the coin is tossed and lands tails.
But, presupposing that the coin does land heads, the chance fact does necessitate that this result
was explained by the tossing. So, given the facts that the coin is tossed and that it lands heads, the
chance fact fully explains the fact that the tossing explains the landing.8 Similarly, in the atomic
decay case above, the fact that atoms prepared in way P have a chance of decaying within a few
hours near (but not quite) 1 explains the fact that the atom’s state explains its decay within a few
hours. Given the fact that the atom decays, the chance fact fully explains the fact that its decay is
explained by its preparation.
Can we appeal to the occurrence of the outcome in giving this explanation? We are not sure.
The chance fact does not, by itself, guarantee that either the setup or outcome occurs, only that if
they do, the former explains the latter. One might worry that if the chance doesn’t guarantee the
6 For a similar view, see Humphreys (1989: 112). Like us, Humphreys argues that in chancy cases, there is a partial but not
a full explanation of the outcome.
7 Thanks to Martin Pickup for discussion of this point.
8 See Hicks (2021: 539-540) for a discussion of this point.
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existence of the outcome fact it cannot guarantee that the setup explains it, or that it is problemat-
ically circular to appeal to the occurrence of the outcome in explaining why the setup explains it.
So, if we cannot presuppose the occurrence of the outcome for the higher-order explanation, then
the higher-order explanation is also partial.9 The partiality of the first-order explanation infects
the higher level. Whether the higher-order explanation is full or partial, on our view, depends on
whether we are explaining an explanatory relationship between two events, given that they occur,
or instead explaining the fact that the first event has anything to explain at all.
Our view that chancy outcomes are only partially explained accommodates some of the intu-
itions driving the the no-explanation view. We take it that the no-explanation view derives much
of its support from the idea that full explanations are necessitating. Here, we’ve shown that we
can accept the connection between full explanation and necessity and still retain the view that
chancy outcomes are explained by their setups. In what follows, we will assume that outcomes of
chance processes do have explanations, albeit partial ones, and proceed to investigate how those
explanations work.
In this paper our focus is on first-order event explanations and on higher-order explanations
of first-order explanatory facts by chance facts. Of course, explanatory demands can in general be
iterated, so we can also pose the third-order explanatory question: what explains the higher-order
explanatory fact that chances explain first-order explanatory facts? While we do not need to com-
mit to any specific answer to these third- and higher-order explanatory questions, we think these
questions are well-posed and admit of various coherent possible answers. One possibility (remi-
niscent of the ’upwards anti-primitivism’ of Bennett, 2017), is to say that the chance fact itself is the
answer to all explanatory questions at the third order and above; another possibility (reminiscent
of Wilson, 2019) is to cite the chance fact along with some relevant law of metaphysics; a third
possibility (reminiscent of Dasgupta, 2014) is to cite the essence of the higher-order explanatory
fact at the third order while rejecting explanatory questions at fourth and higher orders. All these
options seem in principle available to a defender of the mediator view.
Although for simplicity we have formulated our view against a background of fundamental
chance, we are sympathetic to the view that there are chances at many different levels of descrip-
tion. And we are also sympathetic to the view that any particular event can have multiple expla-
nations. So, if there are chances at some higher level – the level of economics or sociology, for
example – but these chances result from coarse-graining a deterministic lower-level theory, we
think that the higher-level chancy explanation of some outcome is a partial explanation, but the
deterministic lower-level theory provides a full explanation of the outcome. But we also think it
quite plausible that there are chances all the way down; if fundamental-level explanations are
chancy, then there are partial explanations without any underlying full explanation.
2 ARGUMENTS FOR THEMEDIATOR VIEW
The view that laws of nature don’t directly feature in scientific explanations has been growing
in popularity in the recent literature.10 We take the basic insight of this ’higher-order’ view to be
as follows. In (at least a large class of) scientific explanations, particular events are explained by
9 Leuenberger (2020) provides an extended discussion of the possibility of partial ground without full ground.
10 Proponents of this view, including Scriven (1959), Ruben (1990), and Skow (2016), have argued that laws of nature don’t
explain, but instead feature in higher-order explanations or background justifications. Skow (2014) argues for a mixed
view on which chances feature in higher-order explanations of causal relations, but directly feature in “near-necessity”
explanation; here we argue for a view on which explanations invoking chance are always higher-order.
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other particular events. Laws, by contrast, determine which particular events explain which other
particular events. Often, one event explains another event by causing it. The laws are part of the
explanation of why this particular event is a cause of that one. So the laws feature directly in a
higher-order explanation: the explanation of the holding of the explanatory relation.
The same general considerationswhich support the higher-order view of the explanatory role of
laws also support the mediator view of the explanatory role of chances. In this section, we explore
how these considerations play out in the specific context of chancy explanation. We identify three
distinct arguments in favour of the mediator view: an argument from ontological type mismatch
(2.1), an argument from redundant dependence (2.2), and an argument from chance reduction-
ism (2.3). The first two of these arguments form our principal case for the mediator view and are
available to most views of the metaphysics of chance, while the third relies on more specific com-
binations of views about chance. Our focus here is on defending the claim that chances do not
feature in first-order explanation. However, our arguments also tell against the no-explanation
view, since their premises entail that chancy outcomes often have explanations: the events that
(indeterministically) cause them.
2.1 Type mismatch between chances and causes
Causal explanations provide information about causal relations. Causation, as ordinarily con-
ceived, is a relation between events; causal explanation is then a relation between facts specifying
the occurrence of events, which we are calling occurrence facts. Probabilistic facts, by contrast,
do not specify the occurrence of any particular events; they are modal facts over and above all the
occurrence facts. The chance fact is not just a fact about what happens: it’s a statement probabilis-
tically linking the occurrence of the setup to the occurrence of the outcome. And like explanations
involving laws of nature, this statement has amodal component: rather thanmerely talking about
what actually happens, it provides additional information about what is possible, necessary, or
likely. This leads to the following argument:
The argument from ontological mismatch
Premise 1: Causal explanations hold between occurrence facts.
Premise 2: Chance facts are not occurrence facts.
Conclusion: Chance facts are not the right sort of things to be explanantia in a causal expla-
nation.
This argument seems most compelling in the context of process theories, which hold that cau-
sation involves the transmission of conserved quantities; since the chances don’t transmit such
quantities they aren’t suited to be causes. But while other theories of chancy causation have more
room for manoeuvre, we think this argument is sound.
First, a note: we do not mean to imply that chance facts feature in no explanations. Don’t forget
that one of the components of our view is Chances mediate explanation, which commits us to
the view that chance facts feature directly in higher-order explanations. On our view, though, the
chance facts aren’t explanantia in causal explanations – instead, they mediate these explanations,
by grounding (and therefore explaining) the fact that some particular setup fact explains some
outcome fact.
Premise 1 says that the only explanantia in a causal explanation are facts specifying the occur-
rence of certain events (the causes). This premise might at first appear to be tautologous. For
HICKS and WILSON 9
what makes an explanation causal, one might think, is just that its explanantia events cause its
explanandum event. But at least some philosophers will resist Premise 1. For example, Lewis
(1986) claims that any information about the causal history of an event can feature in a causal
explanation of that event and Railton (1981) holds that an explanation can be any part of an ideal
explanatory text, where the complete ideal explanatory text will not just provide the causes of the
event, but also information about why or how they cause the outcome (and perhaps more: for
Railton the ideal explanatory text “reflects not only an ideal of explanation, but of scientific under-
standing" (Railton 1981: 243-4). On both views, a causal explanation can include facts which are
not – or at least not directly – about causes.
Nonetheless, on Lewis’s view, non-causal facts are included in explanations only because they
give us information about the causes. For Lewis, information about the causal history can include
the information that the event was uncaused, or that some particular event was not a cause of the
event.We agree that this is explanatorily relevant information. Butwe think that it is relevant inso-
far as it provides information about the occurrence facts; the occurrence facts are the explanantia,
and facts feature in a causal explanation insofar as they tell us about the explanantia.
We take Lewis to be explicating a form of what Andersen (2018: 488) calls narrow causal expla-
nation. Narrow causal explanations seek to explain events by positing causes of those events. By
contrast, Andersen’s broad scientific explanations explain “by virtue of situating an explanandum
in the network of causal relations in the world” and include explanations in which “any of the
explanans, explanandum, or connection between them involves a causal relationship(s) or relata”
(Andersen 2018: 488).
Railton’s notion of an ideal explanatory text is of this broader sort. Railton holds that an ideal or
complete causal explanation needs to include, in addition to information about the causes, infor-
mation about the relationship between the causes and the explanandum.11 For Railton, the ideal
explanation “comprises the things a research program seeks to discover in developing the capacity
to produce better explanations of chance phenomena” (Railton 1981: 243). Here, we disagree. A
research program, in order to produce better explanations of chance phenomena, needs to explain
not just the phenomena, but also the relationship between the phenomena and their explanan-
tia. And that might not be all! To produce explanations, a scientific research program may also
include things which are not themselves explanations at all, including instructions or recipes for
constructing scientific models. We conclude that Railton’s ideal explanatory text is too broad; as
Anderson (2018: 490) points out, a too broad notion of explanation risks collapsing important
distinctions in the target of the explanation – not, in our view, an ideal way of illuminating the
subtleties of scientific explanation.12 Wewill return to Railton in section 3.1, whenwe discuss how
explanation relates to understanding in more detail.
Premise 2 may also be controversial. In support of it: occurrence facts specify that some event
occurs, and the occurrence of an event is spatiotemporally located. By contrast, chances are not
located in space and time, and, intuitively, are not occurrences; they are modal facts over and
above events. There is a (future) event of your finishing this paper; but there is no event of your
possibly finishing the paper; similarly, there is no event of your probably finishing the paper. The
modal fact is not about any particular occurrence.
11 Railton distinguishes causal explanations, which he takes to be deterministic, from probabilistic explanations. Since
we hold that causation can be probabilistic, we do not follow him in making this distinction. Nonetheless we think our
arguments here apply generally to scientific event-explanation.
12 Thanks to Noelia Iranzo Ribera for discussion of this point.
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This claim could be resisted, especially by philosopherswhohold epistemic or subjectivist views
about chance. On these views of chance, chance facts give us partial information about events. So
while a chance may not be a cause, a chancy fact may give us information about causes; it may
therefore be eligible to act as an explanans in a causal explanation, insofar as it provides partial
information about occurrence facts.
Chancy facts, as they feature in causal explanation, are not facts about the cause. Rather, they
are modal facts about the effect. If some setup makes some outcome likely, then (on an epistemic
or subjectivist view of chance) the chance fact gives us partial information about the outcome,
not the setup. For example, in our decay example, the setup makes it overwhelmingly likely that
the Bohrium atom will decay. The setup here is the isolation of the unstable Bohrium atom, and
the outcome is alpha decay. So the chance fact – that alpha decay is overwhelmingly likely – is a
fact about the likelihood of the outcome. Facts about the outcome, whether complete or partial,
are simply not the right sort of thing to feature as an explanans in a causal explanation. If chance
facts are about events in this way, then causal explanations which invoke them as explanantia are
problematically circular.
We conclude that chance facts are not suited to be explanantia in causal explanation.
2.2 Redundant dependence
Everyone (or nearly everyone) agrees that chances have something to do with explanations of
outcomes. Chances being objective probabilities, the corresponding explanations are also natu-
rally taken to be objective in nature. We follow Kim (1994) in holding that objective explanations
are backed by real-world dependence relations. So we may ask: what dependence relations hold
between the chance facts and the other facts involved in chancy event explanations? Reflecting on
this question yields our second argument for the mediator view: unless we adopt the view, we are
obliged to recognise an unattractive redundant dependencewith two distinct paths of dependence
between the setup and the outcome.
The argument from redundant dependence
Premise 1: Outcome facts are causally explained – at least in part – by setup facts.
Premise 2: Chance facts non-causally depend on setup facts.
Conclusion: If chance facts – even partially – explain outcome facts, then there are twodistinct
explanatory dependencies between setup facts and outcome facts.
Since the chance facts themselves are (we assume) non-causally dependent on the setup fact,
and since the outcome (we assume) causally depends on the setup in at least some cases, then
any explanation of the outcome in terms of the chance fact will give rise to redundancy in the
explanatory dependency between setup and outcome. We are left with two routes between setup
and outcome: one route going via the chances (with a non-causal component), one direct (and
purely causal) route. This redundancy is implausible, and so it provides a reason to reject the
view that chances explain outcomes.
As with the argument from ontological mismatch of the previous section, the argument from
redundant dependence turns on cases of chancy causal explanation. Perhaps not all cases of
chancy event explanation are of this sort; for example, perhaps some cases of chancy event expla-
nation involve only nomic dependence without any appeal to causal concepts. However, we think
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that there are a number of important cases of chancy causal explanation, and there is pressure to
understand chancy explanation uniformly across both causal and non-causal scenarios.
The argument is sound both given the view that setups explain outcomes by making them very
probable (the high-probability view) and given the view that setups explain outcomes by making
themmore probable than theywould be (the probability raising view). Both views connect chance
to causation, and so are compatible with Premise 1. On the first view, the setup causes the outcome
in virtue of making it very probable; on the second view, the setup causes the outcome in virtue
of making it more probable than it would have been.
Premise 2 also holds on nearly every account of chance: the precise chances of outcomes are, at
least partially, grounded in the features of setups. This feature is built into the Lewisian account
of chance, for example, since Lewisian chances at time t are implicitly conditioned on the entire
history of the world up to t. Other accounts of chance often make chance setups more localized
than that; for example, Schaffer (2007) imposes an Intrinsicness Requirement that “chance values
should remain constant across intrinsically duplicate trials” (p.125). The chance of heads on the
next flip of this coin depends on how the coin is shaped and how it is tossed; the chance of an atom
decaying depends on the balance between neutrons and protons in its nucleus. The dependence
is non-causal: the intermolecular forces partially ground the chances, but they don’t cause the
chances to be what they are.
However, the Conclusion is unpalatable: it renders our explanandum problematically overde-
termined. It also seems to over-state (or double-count) the explanatory role of the chances: the
chances feature both as a contributing cause or explanans of the explanandum and as the connec-
tor between the setup and the outcome.
One way out of this overdependence jam would be to posit the chances as an intermediary
explainer of the outcome: the explanans non-causally produces the chances, and the chances
explain the outcome–whether by causing it, or in someotherway. This sort of view is advocated by
Elliot (manuscript); for Elliot both explanations are non-causal. But the non-causal version of this
view is also susceptible to significant hurdles: it seems that adding in these intermediate explainers
unnecessarily multiplies the number of links in the explanatory chain. In indeterministic cases,
there will always be a chance-event between a cause and an effect, non-causally produced by the
cause and explaining the effect. And if this view is to be applied uniformly to deterministic cases
(where the chance of the outcome given the setup is 1), this view seems to imply that there is always
an intermediate explainer (the outcome’s having chance 1) between any deterministic setup and
its outcome. We think that this proliferation of links in the explanatory chain is best avoided.
Another response to the overdependence pickle would be to hold that the two routes from setup
to outcome – the chance-involving route and the direct route – present distinct, non-competing,
complementary explanations of the same outcome. Distinguishing levels of explanation is a com-
mon theme of the contemporary literature on causal explanation. For example, a number of
interventionist-style responses to Kim’s causal exclusion argument permit both mental variables
and underlying physical variables to be causes of mental events, but only relative to different
models or levels of grain for the model’s variables. According to this response, chances would be
higher-level variables, giving partial information about the underlying setups. Then chance facts
explain in the same way that other higher-level facts explain. We think this response makes an
important category error: it represents chances as (coarse-grained) events, whereas we think they
are properties of events (of whatever grain). We also note that this response makes an important
concession to our view. For the response accepts that there are explanations of chancy events
which do not invoke the chances as explanans. However, it differs from our view by also accept-
ing explanations of the outcome which only invoke the chance, and not the setup. We argued
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in the previous section that such explanations cannot be causal explanations, and since they are
intended to be objective explanations we are assuming that they need to be backed by some objec-
tive dependency relation. In the absence of any plausible candidate for that dependency relation,
we are doubtful that the interventionist treatment of redundant explanations in chancy contexts
as non-competing can be sustained.
A further problem for either of these ways of preserving chances as direct explainers of out-
comes is that it is wholly unclear what the nature of an objective dependence relation between
chance and outcome might look like. We have already argued in the previous section that the
dependence relation cannot be a causal one. What else could it be? It doesn’t seem like metaphys-
ical or modal dependence, since the chance facts don’t necessitate the outcome any more than
the setup does.13 Nor can it be a probabilistic dependence – this is subtle, but the outcome doesn’t
depend probabilistically on the probabilities (unless a distinct set of higher-order probabilities are
mediating that dependence). Rather, outcomes depend causally or probabilistically on features of
setups: the weight of the dice, or the number of balls in the urn that are a certain colour, are what
determines the likelihood of the outcome. This probabilistic fact determines whether the setup
explains the outcome. But if the setup does explain the outcome, it does so on its own.
Recently, Nina Emery (forthcoming) has argued that events depend on laws, but that this
dependence is neither causal nor metaphysical. On Emery’s view, causal and metaphysical expla-
nation aremembers of a family of dependence relations, but they are not the onlymembers: lawful
dependence is another, distinct form of dependence. Facts about chances and laws back expla-
nations, but these explanations are neither metaphysical (grounding) explanations nor are they
causal explanations. Similarly, Skow (2014) argues that chances feature in “near-necessity” expla-
nations. On Skow’s view, we can explain something by showing that it must happen; the modal
fact can directly explain an outcome. If a chance is high enough, it can provide an explanation by
showing that something is nearly necessary. Like Emery, Skow holds that the chance explanation
invokes a dependence relation that is similar to, but distinct from, metaphysical necessitation.14
These views might accept the conclusion of our argument and embrace overdetermination, albeit
with a different flavour of dependence for each route from setup to outcome. We do not have a
knock-down argument against these views, butwe can get in a couple of sucker-punch arguments.
First, these views unnecessarily multiply dependence relations, and so violate Occam’s razor. If a
view like ours can account for the explanatory data, then it should be preferred on grounds of par-
simony. Second, we wonder whether these near-necessity or nomic dependence relations crowd
out causal explanations. Surely some chancy explanations of outcomes are causal. But if these
explanations always include the chances, and the outcome depends on the chances via some non-
causal dependence relation, it is difficult to seewhen or how causal dependence enters the picture.
2.3 Fundamental explanations and chance reductionism
Our final argument will only appeal to philosophers with specific commitments, but we
think those commitments are sufficiently widespread to make the argument interesting. Many
13 Though see Emery (2019) for an argument that metaphysical dependence need not necessitate in these chancy cases.
14 Skow admits that inmany cases, this near-necessitation is conditional. For example, the near necessity of alpha decay for
a particular atomic nucleus is conditional on its being prepared with an unstable balance of neutrons and protons. Skow
holds that the chance fact directly explains the outcome in these setups; we hold that the setup explains the outcome,
mediated by the chance, and that in general when some outcome is conditionally nearly necessitated, the explanation is
whatever the chances are conditional on.
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philosophers hold that chance facts are not fundamental facts; instead, they are grounded in fun-
damental facts. Call this view chance reductionism. Chance reductionism is in strong tension with
the claim that chances are explanantia in explanations of events. For, if quantum mechanics is
correct, some fundamental events have chancy explanations. But fundamental events cannot be
explained by non-fundamental events. That gets the direction of explanation backwards. This
leads to:
The argument from chance reductionism
Premise 1 (Chance Reductionism): Chance facts reduce to non-chance facts.
Premise 2 (Explanatory Purity): Only fundamental facts can explain fundamental facts.
Premise 3 (Chancy Explanation): Some fundamental occurrence facts have chancy
explanations.
Conclusion: There are chancy explanations that do not include chance facts.
Many philosophers reject Premise 1, but some prominent views are committed to it. The most
prominent is the Humean modified frequentist view, on which chances feature in the most effi-
cient summary of all facts (Lewis 1980, 1996, Loewer, 2004). ButHumeans are not the only chance-
reductionists. For example, hypothetical frequentists hold that chances are made true by coun-
terfactuals about infinite sequences. The hypothetical frequentist holds that coin flips have a 0.5
chance of coming up heads because, were you to flip a coin infinitely many times, the limiting rel-
ative frequency of heads in that sequence would be 0.5. If these counterfactuals are basic, along
the lines of Lange (2009) or made true by dispositions (Bird 2007: 129), then the chance facts are
neither fundamental nor Humean. See also Hoefer (2019) for a recent non-Humean reductionist
view.
Premise 2 is connected to widely held views concerning the explanation of the fundamental.
We take Premise 2 to be motivated by the same sort of thinking that motivates the causal closure
of the physical: if physics is fundamental, how could something non-physical cause something
physical? Premise 2 will also be hard to reject for those who accept Sider’s (2013: 106) notion of
purity. For Sider, the fundamental facts can be expressed without recourse to non-fundamental
vocabulary. It is no stretch to hold that fundamental facts should be explained without recourse
to non-fundamental facts as well. It is also similar to Field (1980)’s intrinsicness requirement on
explanation: explanations should cite factswhich are intrinsic to the explanans and explanandum.
For similar principles, see Eddon (2014), Field (1980), Milne (1986), and Shumener (2021).
We take Premise 3 to be an empirical fact about our world, which is very likely true. If quantum
events are fundamental, and if they are produced by chancy processes, then Premise 3 holds. If
the successor theory to quantum mechanics retains the chancy nature of quantum mechanics –
something we think is likely – then Premise 3 is also true.
We note that while the mediator view of chances allows chance-reductionists to accept chancy
explanations of fundamental facts, it requires them to take these explanatory facts to be non-
fundamental. For on the mediator view, chances feature in higher-level explanations. They
explain the fact that some fundamental events explain other fundamental events. So, given
Explanatory Purity, when the setup and outcome in some explanation are fundamental facts, the
fact that the setup explains the outcome is not itself a fundamental fact. Rather than being a cost
of the view, this looks to us like a friendly conclusion for chance reductionists. Just as the chances
are non-fundamental, facts about chancy explanation are non-fundamental. They hold in virtue
of the chances and whatever those chance facts reduce to. It is similar in many ways to the Sider’s
(2013: 107) argument that facts about what grounds what are non-fundamental facts.
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3 IN DEFENSE OF THEMEDIATOR VIEW
Thus far, our arguments have aimed to show that chances don’t feature in first order explana-
tion. Given all we’ve said so far, chances might have no role to play in explanation at all. But
there are powerful reasons to think that chances do have some role to play in the explanation of
chance events. We will now argue that the role of chance is to mediate explanations. To do so,
we will consider three motivations for taking chances to feature in explanation, and argue that in
each case the role of chance facts is higher-order: the chance facts explain the first-order explana-
tory dependence. First (section 3.1) we’ll argue that the mediator view elucidates the connection
between explanation and understanding. Next, we will show how the connection between expla-
nation and expectation supports the mediator view (section 3.2). Then, we’ll show how the medi-
ator view accommodates inference to the best explanation (section 3.3). In each case, our strategy
will be to identify a misconstrual of chance’s higher-order explanatory role for a first-order role.
In this way, our view reconciles the powerful intuition that chances explain with our arguments
in section 2 that they do not.
3.1 Explanation and understanding
Explanations lead to understanding, but (one might worry) understanding a phenomenon
requires an understanding of how it came about. Fully understanding a phenomenon doesn’t
just involve knowing its particular causes; it additionally requires us to situate the phenomenon
in a larger causal web. Here’s Jonathan Schaffer making this point:
What I am primarily rejecting at this stage are causes-only accounts of causal expla-
nation. Scriven (1959) and Skow (2016) both hold something like this view, on which
laws play no role in causal explanation. Against such accounts, I [. . . ] hold that such
accounts fail to illuminate the connections between explanations and unification,
manipulation, and understanding. For instance, consider a double-slit experiment in
which repeated firings of a laser cause an interference pattern to appear on a screen.
This is a quantum effect which cannot be understood from a classical perspective.
My claim is that information about the causes (the firings of the laser) is not enough
to understand why there was an interference pattern. For that one also needs infor-
mation about the laws (the quantum dynamics governing light), to reveal how the
causes and the effect are connected. (Schaffer, 2017: 308)
Schaffer argues that explanation leads to understanding, and uses this connection to
argue that chances and laws are explainers (note that in Schaffer’s example the laws are
indeterministic). But this argument seems to us to draw on too blunt a connection between expla-
nation and understanding. We agree that knowing the causes of an event is not enough to fully
understand the event. Understanding requires knowing the explanation, but knowing the expla-
nation is not sufficient for understanding. A full understanding of some event requires us to
know more than just what explains the event; we need to also know how the explanans explain
the explanandum.15 Knowing how an explanandum was brought about does take more than just
15 Further complications are involved when philosophers consider explanations to primarily be communicative acts, such
as answers towhy-questions, as in van Fraassen (1980), Skow (2016), and Potochnik (2017: ch. 5.1). For when we communi-
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knowing what the causes of the event are. But that is no objection to our view, because knowing
how an explandumwas brought about is different from knowing why the event happened. Know-
ing why an event happened involves knowing which events explain the event; knowing how an
event was brought about involves knowing why those events explain it. Knowing how a chancy
event was brought about involves the chances, at least in part because knowing how the event
was brought about requires us to explain not just the event, but also the explanatory relationship
between the event and its explanantia. This additional knowledge comes from the explanation of
the explanation, and these higher-order explanations do involve chances. Although higher-order
explanations have a different explanatory target than the direct explanation of the event, they add
to our understanding of it by showing how the (first-order) explanantia produced it.
This recalls Railton’s discussion of an ideal explanatory text containing everything relevant to
understanding an event. When pursuing scientific understanding of some event, we need to do
much more than just explain that event. We need to situate that explanation in a hierarchy of
other explanations. And, in our view, not all of these explanations will be of the target phenom-
ena. Some of them will be of distinct, but similar phenomena; others will be higher-order expla-
nations which elucidate the ways in which the phenomena are explained. Schaffer and Railton
collapse first-order explanations of particular events, explanations of repeated phenomena and
event types, and higher-order explanations which elucidate these explanatory relations into one
ideal text. Perhaps a Railtonian ideal explanatory text does contain both a first-order explanation
of a phenomenon and a higher-order explanation telling us why or how that explanation works;
perhaps it even includes explanation at some or all higher orders as well. If higher-order explana-
tions are included, then (on the mediator view) chances feature in the ideal explanatory text for
particular events. But we think that if they do, they are not included as explanans; rather, they are
included to elucidate how the explanans bring about or explain the explanandum.16 This connec-
tion between chances and understanding, then, provides evidence for the mediator view: the fact
that chances explain the first-order explanatory facts itself explains the fact that the chance facts
are necessary for understanding a phenomenon.
3.2 Explanation and expectation
A similar connection between explanation and rational expectation can be explained by themedi-
ator view:
“An explanation does not show that the event was to be expected; it shows what sorts
of expectations would have been reasonable and under what circumstances it was to
cate in a context, we aim to add to the common ground, that is, the shared storehouse of propositions which are not only
known by all participants, but also known to be known by all participants. So, when cooperative interlocutors answer a
question, they are required not only to provide an answer to the question, but also to ensure that their audience knows
that they have answered the question. This second step often requires cooperative communicators to include information
that explains why the (first-order) explanation is an explanation. Despite the fact that communicative contexts require us
to provide this information in answering a why-question, it has a different target than the original question.
16Why does this distinction matter? First, if our aim is to understand how explanations lead to understanding, correctly
differentiating the way in which different parts of an ideal explanatory text contribute to understanding is a valuable and
important part of that task on its own. Second, it is useful in what Railton calls “stringing together [. . . ] explanations or
amalgamating themwith larger explanations” (1981: 236). As we argue in section 4.3, whether we can apply the transitivity
of explanation depends quite a bit on what the explanans are, as do metaphysical constraints on what can be explanatory.
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be expected. To explain an event is to show to what degree it was to be expected. . . ”
(Salmon 1971: 79, quoted in Elliot MS: 15)
Katrina Elliot, drawing on Salmon, claims that “scientific explanations are the best possible
grounds we could have had for our expectations about whether an event occurs prior to its
occurrence” (Elliot MS: 17), and argues that “the best possible admissible grounds for forming
our expectations about whether an event will occur, and thus all we need in an explanation of the
event’s occurrence, is simply information about an event’s chance of occurring” (Elliot MS: 19).
We agreewith Elliot that explanantia provide grounds for expectations. Butwe do not think this
requires them to include the chances. If you know that a Bohrium atom is prepared in an unstable
state, then you have grounds for expecting (with credence near 1) that the atom will soon decay;
if you know that the fair coin will be flipped, then you have grounds for expecting (with credence
0.5) that the coin will come up heads.
We think that knowledge of the explanantia provides the grounds for these credences all by
themselves. But one might wonder how you are supposed to know what credence to have on the
basis of the explanans. This is a different question, and answering it brings in higher-order evi-
dence: evidence about what attitude your first-order evidence supports regarding the outcome.
This desire for higher-order evidence requires a higher-order explanation. The chance facts fea-
ture in this higher-order explanation by telling you precisely what attitude the explanantia ground
regarding the explanandum. The first-order explanation provides the best grounds for your expec-
tation of the outcome; the higher-order explanation provides your best grounds for beliefs about
what expectation to have concerning the outcome. Thus the connection between explanation and
expectation also provides evidence for the mediator view, once first-order evidence and higher-
order evidence are properly distinguished. The fact that chances provide the best grounds for
beliefs about what expectations to form supports the view that they feature in higher-order expla-
nations of the events.
We suspect that philosophers who collapse these distinct explanations, with distinct
explananda, into one explanation may be smuggling in internalist notions of evidence. On our
view, one could have evidence which supports a certain attitude towards, say, the Bohrium decay
without knowing that one’s evidence required that attitude. Someone who lacked this higher-
order evidencemight not knowwhat expectation to form despite knowing the explanation for the
decay. Their evidence would decisively favor a certain attitude but they would not know it. For
confident externalists like us, this is not an unusual or surprising situation for a person to be in,
but we understand that it rubs internalists the wrong way.
We agree with internalists, though, that there is a sense in which such a person would not fully
understand the phenomena, even though they had an explanation of it. Plausibly, understanding
a phenomenon does require more than having the right expectations regarding that outcome.
Those expectations should not be lucky; they should themselves be based on evidence. We do not
aim for a complete account of scientific understanding here – far from it! But we humbly suggest
that, in cases like these, understanding a phenomenon requires more than just an explanation of
that phenomenon. It also requires a higher-order explanation. When agents have both, they have
both the evidence they need to form expectations about that phenomenon, and they know why
those are the right attitudes to have regarding the phenomenon. So we agree that there are deep
connections between explanation, expectation, and understanding; but we take a nuanced view
of these connections which distinguishes first-order and higher-order beliefs and explanations.
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3.3 Inferring chances as the best explanation
Our epistemic access to the chances comes, at least in part, fromobserving frequencies. Our exper-
imental confirmation of quantummechanics comes predominantly from observing the outcomes
of chancy quantum events like atomic decays or particle deflections; our evidence for everyday
chances, like dice rolls and coin flips, similarly comes from observing the long term frequencies
of outcomes of similarly prepared setups.
One way of understanding this is via inference to the best explanation (IBE). We posit simple
chance theories to explain observed stable long-run frequencies. Philosophers sympathetic to IBE
might worry that since we’ve rejected the view that chances explain, we can’t accept the view
that chances are the best explanation of outcomes. And if chances aren’t the best explanation of
outcomes, the IBE doesn’t get off the ground. How, then, do we gain knowledge of the chances
via observed outcomes?
IBE provides further evidence that the chances are involved in higher-order explanation.17 For
the mediator view shows how chances can be inferred via IBE without featuring in first-order
explanation. To successfully learn the chances via IBE, on the mediator view, takes three steps.
First, one observes an outcome. Next, one infers that the outcome was explained by its setup.
Finally, one infers the chance theory as the best explanation of this explanatory relationship.
In practice, inferring that the setup explains the outcome and inferring the chance theorywhich
mediates this explanation may happen at the same time. To show that some setup explains an
outcome, it’s best to also show how or why it explains that outcome. Answering this how or why
question requires us to provide a higher-level explanation. Therefore we will often infer the best
meta-explanation at the same time that we infer the best explanation of the outcome. Our point
here is that, even when these two inferences happen concurrently, they consist in separate infer-
ential steps. These steps can come together, but they might not happen concurrently: formulating
an explanatory chance theory often requires observing multiple instances of chancy causation in
different contexts.
The mediator view has further advantages: it connects apparently disparate features of IBE.
On the mediator view, we prefer unifying theories for the same reason we prefer explanations
with few causes. When making an inference about particular events, Occam’s razor tells us to
find an explanation with as few causes as possible. For example, if I come home to find that all of
the rooms in my house have been ransacked, I typically infer that one burglar has ransacked the
entire house, rather than a series of burglars independently ransacking each room.
Applying the same principle to the explanations of explanatory relationships requires us to pre-
fer unificatory theories, for a unificatory theory explains awider variety of first-order explanations
than a non-unificatory theory. For example, Newtonian gravity unified the terrestrial mechanics
of projectiles with the astronomical behavior of the planets and moon; it did this by providing a
common ground for the distinct explanations of these apparently disparate phenomena. Our pref-
erence for a unified higher-order explanation of these disparate first-order explanations is directly
analogous to our preference for a unified causal factor in causal explanation. Chance theories can
be similarly unificatory – for example, the method of arbitrary functions explains why stable fre-
quencies result from chance setups ranging from dice to coins to roulette wheels.
17We’re not convinced that the only way of modeling this inference is via IBE – for example, it can also be modelled via
Bayesian conditionalization on observed frequencies. But these might not actually be different inference methods – we
are sympathetic to compatibilism between I and Bayesian inference, as in Henderson (2014).
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4 BEARING ON ARGUMENTS INMETAPHYSICS
The mediator view has consequences for a number of debates about the metaphysics of chance.
Here, we will address some of these. First, we discuss questions concerning particular chance
explanations: in section 4.1 we showhow themediator view bears on the explanatory power of low
chances. Next we consider the view’s implications for accounts of chance: chance reductionism
(section 4.2) and epistemic views of chances (section 4.3). Finally, (section 4.4) we discuss the
question of why there is something rather than nothing from the perspective of the mediator
view.
4.1 Low chance and explanation
Both Strevens (2000) and Skow (2014) argue that higher chances are better explanations than
lower chances. They pit this view against Railton’s (1981) egalitarianism, according to which the
explanatory power of chances doesn’t depend on their size: small chances explain just as well as
large ones.
Suppose that some unlikely event occurs. For example, imagine that our sample of Bohrium
atoms from section 1.3 entirely fails to decay after a few hours. By stipulation, the chance that
this happens, given the Bohrium atom’s setup, is near zero. What explains that it failed to decay?
On the mediator view, this is explained by the setup, just as its decay would have been explained
by the setup had the decay occurred instead. In the case of non-decay, the setup did not make
this outcome likely (quite the reverse). Nonetheless, we maintain that the setup explains its (very
unlikely) outcome. After all, the setup did enable the failure to decay and made it possible; this
is explanatorily non-negligible, and in a case of a very low-chance outcome it may be as much
explanatory information as can be given.
We acknowledge that this consequence of the mediator view initially seems implausible. We
offer two routes to defusing its implausibility. The first route highlights the role of explanatory
contrast classes in driving our judgments of implausibility, and the second route highlights the
matching unlikeliness of the meta-explanation for the first-order explanation.
Begin with the role of contrast classes. What the mediator account maintains is that the setup
explainswhy the outcome occurred, simpliciter. In contrastive terms, this answers the explanatory
question: why did the outcome occur rather than the outcome not occurring? An alternative con-
trastive question would ask: why did the outcome occur rather than some other possible outcome
of the same setup occurring? These are not equivalent questions, and they do not have equiv-
alent answers. In particular, the mediator account does not entail that the setup explains why
the low-chance outcome occurred rather than the high-chance outcome. Plausibly, low chances
can explain why some outcome occurred simpliciter, but only high chances can explain why it
occurred rather than another outcome. Rather, according to the mediator account, in low-chance
cases there often is no explanation whatsoever of why one chancy outcome occurred rather than
another. That is just what it is for the process to be objectively chancy.
Distinguishing these different contrastive questions allows defenders of the mediator view to
respond to the charge of implausibility levelled against their claim that the Bohrium setup entails
the lack of decay. If we wanted to know why the less probable outcome occurred rather than the
more probable outcome, it would indeed be wrong to cite the setup. But if we want to know why
the less probable outcome occurred rather than not occurring, or rather than no outcome at all
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occurring, then it is correct to cite the setup. That is not to say that the setup will in such cases
provide a full or satisfying explanation of the outcome, just that it provides as good an explanation
of the outcome as reality affords.
The second route to defusing the implausibility of the implication that the Bohrium setup
explains the failure to decay is to draw attention again (echoing the discussion in section 3.1) to the
role of the higher-level explanation. Even after contrast classes have been carefully distinguished,
readers may think that the explanation of the outcome in terms of the setup remains unsatis-
factory. How can anything explain an outcome when it makes that outcome so overwhelmingly
improbable? Our response to this rhetorical question is to agree that the situation is extremely
surprising, but to locate this surprisingness in the fact that the chance explanation itself had an
extremely low probability of holding. Before the experiment was switched on, it was extremely
improbable that the Bohrium would fail to decay. A fortiori, it was extremely improbable that
switching on the experiment would explain the Bohrium failing to decay. Just as the failure to
decay surprising, so too is the explanatory fact which holds partially in virtue of that failure to
decay. We accordingly would like to diagnose any residual implausibility of our (suitably disam-
biguated) claim that in such a situation the setup explains the failure to decay as issuing from a
(correct!) recognition of the deep objective likelihood of this situation in fact coming to pass. It is
a feature and not a bug of our view that it renders true some surprising claims in situations which
are – in and of themselves – extremely surprising.
4.2 Explanation and chance reductionism
Proponents of the view that chances explain events take this view to constrain our theory of
chances. The idea is simple: if the chances explain, then they have to be the sort of thing that
can explain. This is especially worrisome if the chances are supposed to explain frequencies since
some theories of chances make chances look more like descriptions of frequencies than explana-
tions of them. Here’s Hájek (1996: 219) presenting this as an argument against finite frequentism:
“We posit chances in order to explain the stability of these relative frequencies. But there is no
explaining to be done if chance just is actual relative frequency: you can’t explain something by
reference to itself.”
Very few philosophers now defend finite frequentism.18 Butmany defend a related view, chance
reductionism, according to which chances are grounded in non-chancy facts. Most chance reduc-
tionists take those non-chancy facts to include the frequencies. One popular way to be a chance
reductionist is to subscribe to theHumeanBest SystemAnalysis (BSA) (although seeHoefer 201919
18 Naive frequentism presents an interesting counterexample to our view which does not arise on more developed chance
reductionist accounts. For the naive frequentist identifies chances with certain events. Consequently, on the frequentist
view, there will be some cases in which setups are chances. For example, we might explain the fact that 15% of smokers
get cancer by appealing to the fact that 20% of smokers have a particular gene which increases the likelihood of cancer.
On the frequentist view, the fact that 20% of smokers have the gene is both the chance of having the gene and a setup
condition for a chance-based explanation of having cancer. Since our thesis Setups Explain Outcomes holds both that
setups do explain outcomes and that chances don’t, the dual nature of frequentist chances leads us to a contradiction.
Naive frequentists should revise our two theses: frequencies qua setup events explain other events, and frequencies qua
chances explain explanatory facts. Note, though, that even on this revised view frequencies never explain themselves, and
instead only explain other frequencies. Thanks to Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra for discussion of this case.
19 Although Hoefer’s theory of chance is Humean, he doesn’t commit to the full Humean metaphysical view and is com-
fortable with the prospect of deterministic non-Humean laws at a fundamental level.
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for a Non-Humean chance reductionism). This subscription comes with a metaphysical picture
according to which the world is made up of an array of particular matters of fact, the Humean
mosaic, named for Hume because these matters of fact have no modal connections. The laws and
chances are part of the best system of these matters of fact, where the best system is the most
informative summary of these matters of fact.
NinaEmery (2016: 495) points out that this view is subject to the same explanatory objection that
besets finite frequentism: “although (on the BSA) probabilities are not equivalent to frequencies,
the reason why some probability function ends up being a part of the best system will, at least in
paradigm cases, be because of the existence of some corresponding frequency.” Similarly, Elliott
(2016: 498) claims that “theories of chance according to which chances supervene on the Humean
mosaic have a prima facie difficulty allowing that chances are explanations of (any part of) the
Humean mosaic. The worry is that if the Humean mosaic helps to constitute the chances, then
the chances are ill placed to explain the Humean mosaic."
But the circularity argument against reductionism doesn’t even get off the ground if, as we
argue, chances do not explain parts of the mosaic at all. If the first-order facts are explained by
one another through probabilistic dependence or chancy causal dependence, there will only be
a worrying circularity if there are chancy causal circles (whether there are looks to us like an
empirical matter not connected to the metaphysics of chance).
We do think that the chances feature in higher-order explanations. Could circularity worries
arise here? Perhaps Elliot and Emery would argue that the frequencies should not appear in any
explanation ofwhat explains the frequencies.Wewould be interested in seeing such an argument.20
But we don’t see how this constraint could follow from any sort of general principle about expla-
nation. Naively, it seems quite natural for facts about X to feature in explanations of what can
explain X. In order to show that some Y explains that X, we will need to bring up features of both
X and Y. To explain why your stepping on my tomato plant explains its stunted growth, I will
need to point out features of its stunted growth – for example the fact that the branches that died
are the ones you stepped on. Rather than being circular, this is straightforwardly good practice in
higher-order explanation.
Some Humeans have responded to the circularity worry, in the case of laws, by distinguish-
ing between metaphysical explanation and scientific explanation (Loewer 2012; see also Marshall
2015, Miller 2015, Hicks and van Elswyk 2015, and Bhogal 2020); on this view the chances are
metaphysically explained by facts about the frequencies but scientifically explain those same fre-
quencies. For this move to work, scientific andmetaphysical explanationmust be distinct enough
that they cannot be strung together or combined into a singlemixed explanation (see Lange 2018).
If we’re right, the scientific explanation and metaphysical explanation have different targets and
different explanantia, so the circularity argument fails even if these distinct sorts of explanation
can be combined or feature in the same explanation.
4.3 Explanation and epistemic views about chance
One historically prominent view about chances is the epistemic view. This view takes the chances
in various scientific theories to represent the degrees of beliefs of either the scientists using the
theory or an ideally rational agentwith the evidence provided by the theory. So, the epistemic view
20 One of us has responded to similar arguments in Hicks (2021).
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about chances in statistical mechanics takes statistical mechanical chances to represent the ratio-
nal credence one should have that the system is in a certain microstate, given all the information
we have about its macrostate. Similarly, an epistemic view about quantum mechanical chances
holds that the chances of quantummechanics (encoded in the quantumwavefunction) represent
the credences rational agents should aim for when using the theory to predict the outcomes of
measurements. One popular version of this view isQuantum Bayesianism,21 which holds that the
quantum state represents the credences of agent, and that the apparent collapse when ameasure-
ment occurs is best understood as a form of conditionalization. Finally, the method of arbitrary
functions takes objective chances to be subjective credences “objectified” by deterministic pro-
cesses (Myrvold, 2010; Rosenthal, 2009, Rosenthal 2016, Gallow, 2021).
One popular line of argument against such views is that they leave the relevant physical facts
unexplanatory.Here, for example, is Chris Timpson arguing againstQuantumBayesianism: “Ulti-
mately we are just not interested in agents’ expectation that matter structured like sodium would
conduct; we are interested in why in fact it does so” (Timpson, 2008: 600). David Albert makes
a similar complaint against epistemic views of the probabilities in statistical mechanics: “Can
anybody seriously think that ourmerely being ignorant of the exactmicroconditions of thermody-
namic systems plays some part in bringing it about, inmaking it the case, that (say) milk dissolves
in coffee? How could that be?” (Albert, 2003: 64).
Albert’s worry here is that if the probabilities of statistical mechanics represent the degrees
of belief of an ideal agent who is ignorant of the precise state the coffee cup is in, but knows its
temperature, volume, and other coarse-grained features, then these probabilities are completely
unsuited to explain why milk mixes with the coffee when they are combined. Similarly, Timp-
son’s complaint is that agent’s credences are unsuited to explain why sodium conducts, but the
quantum mechanical chances should explain this.
This argument against epistemic views about chances seems to go like this:
Premise 1: Chance facts explain why certain outcomes obtain or certain processes occur (e.g.
why sodium conducts or milk dissolves in coffee).
Premise 2: Nobody’s epistemic state (not even an ideal person’s) explains why those outcomes
obtain or processes occur22.
Conclusion: Chance facts don’t represent anybody’s epistemic state, not even that of an ideal
agent.
Most discussion of Quantum Bayesianism and epistemic accounts of statistical mechanical
chances focus on Premise 2 of this argument. Premise 2 is prima facie plausible; rejecting Premise
2 seems to make apparently mind-independent occurrences depend on the mental states of real
or imagined ideal agents. If QBism or epistemic theories of statistical mechanics are commit-
ted to rejecting Premise 2, they are in a pretty bad spot. But on the mediator view, the proba-
bilities of quantum mechanics do not explain why matter structured like sodium conducts; the
21 See for example Fuchs (2002) and Fuchs and Schack (2004).
22 Plausibly, some features of our epistemic state can be relevant to whether outcomes obtain. For example, the fact that
someone knows rather thanmerely believes that the explanans event occurredmight be relevant, because (by the factivity
of knowledge) this implies that the explanans event occurred. We take it that whenever someone’s epistemic state is
relevant to an explanation, it is because of these non-epistemic implications (except of course in the special case in which
the outcome is itself epistemic or the effect of a rational decision-making process). Thanks to Katrina Elliot for discussion
of this point.
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probabilities of statistical mechanics do not explain why milk dissolves in coffee. Rather, these
facts are explained by their respective setup facts: the fact that the milk dissolves in the coffee is
explained by the fact that the milk was poured into the coffee, together with some other macro-
scopic facts (the temperature of the fluids, their volumes, etc). The fact that sodium conducts is
explained by its microstructure. The chance facts, recall, explain the fact that the microstructure
of sodium explains is conductivity, or the fact that the combining of milk with coffee explains the
milk’s dissolving. So we’ve argued that Premise 1 of this argument is false.
Can the argument be modified to accommodate the mediator view? Whether this is possible
depends on the correct view of explanation. On pragmatic or epistemic views of explanation, to
explain something is just to show that it was to be expected. On these views epistemic states,
real and ideal, are very well suited to feature in higher-order explanations. An epistemic view of
chance fits nicely with an epistemic view of explanation.
But – as we indicated in section 2.1 – we are sympathetic to more robust views of explanation,
according to which explanations track real-world dependence relations. We take chancy explana-
tion to be an ontic form of explanation (a la Salmon (1984)). While these real-world dependence
relations may generate rational expectations or constrain our epistemic states, they are not those
states. So, we think that the argument above can be modified as follows:
Premise 1*: Chance facts explain why outcome facts depend on their setup facts.
Premise 2*: Nobody’s epistemic state (not even an ideal person’s) explains why outcome facts
depend on their setup facts.
Conclusion: Chance facts don’t represent anybody’s epistemic state, not even that of an ideal
agent.
We think that this argument will convince philosophers who subscribe to ontic views of expla-
nation. But philosophers tempted towards epistemic views of explanationwould reject Premise 2*,
because these philosophers doubt that explanations are backed bymind-independent dependence
relations. If the relevant sort of dependence is epistemic, Premise 2* looks much more dubious.
This gives the epistemic view of chances much more room to manoeuvre than it had previously;
if we’re right, the view is no longer committed to denying Premise 2 of the original argument, and
holding that somebody’s ignorance explains why milk dissolves in coffee.
4.4 Why there is something rather than nothing
The final application of the mediator view which we shall discuss is the most speculative, and we
want to emphasize that it doesn’t form any part of our argument for the mediator view. Nonethe-
less, it illustrates the view’s flexibility.
Perhaps themost notorious of all puzzles of causal explanation involves the idea of a first cause,
itself uncaused. If there is a beginning to time, then two possibilities present themselves: either
the first event is unexplained, or it is explained by something outside the temporal order. Either
way, it is hard to make sense of the universe coming into being ’by chance’, even though this is the
scenario which is frequently contrasted with design scenarios in the fine-tuning argument and
other arguments from design.
Themediator view offers the prospect that chancemight play a role in explaining why an unde-
signed universe begins, not by acting as a direct explainer of the first event, but by mediating a
null explanation of the first event. The idea of null explanation has been discussed in the recent
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literature on grounding (cf. Litland 2017, Schaffer 2021), originating with Fine’s (2012) notion of
zero-grounding. In a null explanation, we have an explanandum with no explanans – the explan-
dum is explained, but by nothing in particular.
Null explanation is weird. But if it is possible, there seems no reason why it should not be
possible for chancy explanation too. In a chancy null explanation, the null explanation ismediated
by objective chances: to take a toy example, there might have been a 0.5 chance of the universe
coming into existence with more matter than anti-matter, and 0.5 chance of the opposite, even
without any prior chance setup.23 Chances are not around before the universe exists to act as direct
explainers of any universe commencement event. But there doesn’t seem to be any reason why
they can’t mediate the transition from nothing to something nonetheless. The chances explain
how nothing gives rise to something.
Howmight the chancesmediating a null explanation be grounded? Certain accounts of chance,
for example those which ground them in a real quantum state, will not fit naturally with a null
explanation. By contrast, Humean accounts appear to have no special problem accounting for null
mediation. There is much more that could be said on this topic; but our aim here has only been
to raise the prospect of null chancy explanation, not to vindicate it.
5 CONCLUSION
Chance is implicated in and indispensable for most of our best scientific explanations. We have
argued for a particular view of the role of chance in scientific explanation, the mediator view,
according to which chance acts as an explanatory link between the worldly facts which feature in
first-order scientific explanations. The mediator view is a plausible and metaphysically conserva-
tive account of the explanatory role of chance hypotheses, and it has interesting consequences for
some active debates in contemporary metaphysics.
The mediator view combines the best features of the two main alternative views. Like the no
explanation view, it does not require us to make chances into physical properties with causal
power, and hence makes room for higher-level chance explanations. Like the chances explain
view, it gives chance a robust explanatory role which makes sense of its ubiquity in science.





23 Demarest (2016) defends the idea of initial chance events with no chance setup in a more physically realistic context:
the foundations of Boltzmannian statistical mechanics.
24 For helpful feedback and discussion on this work, we are grateful to the FraMEPhys project team (Nicholas Emmerson,
JoaquimGiannotti, Francis Longworth, JohnMurphy, Joshua Quirke, Noelia Iranzo Ribera, and Katie Robertson), to Alex
Moran, Martin Pickup, and participants at their Oxford metaphysics work-in-progress seminar, to Ned Hall, Chris Dorst,
and participants at their Harvard workshop on Humeanism, to Barry Loewer, to Elizabeth Miller, to Gonzalo Rodriguez-
Pereyra and most of all to Katie Elliott. This work forms part of the project A Framework for Metaphysical Explanation in
Physics (FraMEPhys), which received funding from the European Research Council (ERC) under the European Union’s
Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme (grant agreement no. 757295). Funding for Alastair Wilson’s contribu-
tion to this work was also provided by the Australian Research Council (grant agreement no. DP180100105).
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